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1. “If one reads the work phenomenologically-analytically and not as normative
theory, it is simply persuasive.” – Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde says this about Carl
Schmitts “The Concept of the Political” (Der Begriff des Politischen) in a biographical
Interview with Dietrich Gosewinkel. “How do you want to understand the political
world today without the insight that the political can lead to enmity time and again? It
doesn’t have to, but it can, and often does.” (p. 372; in English here; Kindle version
here; original version here).
Böckenförde had told Schmitt that he considered Schmitt’s “most important work”
not to be his “Constitutional Theory” (Verfassungslehre) but “The Concept of the
Political”. As Böckenförde saw it, the work “has often been misunderstood,” but
“essentially […] contains, which is clear if one reads it closely, a criteriological-
phenomenological analysis and not a normative theory. And as such it is
correct.” (p. 372): “It is astonishing how Carl Schmitt was able to describe this so
grippingly in about seventy, eighty pages. Of course, in some places there are
polemical accents, but that does not change the fact that I consider [the main insight]
as simply fundamental.” (p. 379; cf. also here, pp. 598, 600, 605, but also p. 606).
The central thesis of Schmitt’s book is that the political is characterized by the friend-
enemy-distinction, that strongest degree of intensity of association or dissociation
that can lead to the willingness to kill the enemy.
It convinced Böckenförde as an analysis of a social phenomenon, a description of
a fundamental fact of social reality, which had to be taken into account by the legal
system: The democratic constitutional order, the freedom and equality of all – those
ideas of Enlightenment of (1776 and) 1789, which Böckenförde, unlike Schmitt,
unconditionally supported – could only be effectively secured and protected if the
possibility of life-or-death enmity was factored in.
For Böckenförde, Schmitt’s analysis contained crucial insights, that unfortunately
still hold true from a sociological point of view, and that a liberal democracy must
not turn a blind eye to, if it is not to be swept away in the state of emergency by the
dynamics of the friend-enemy opposition. Democracy has to prepare for this dynamic
(realized time and again in history, in wars and civil wars as well as in the fight of
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terrorist “partisans”), adapt to it and ensure that there is the ability to act in the event
of such conflicts – without giving up its commitment to liberty.
2. Such lessons can be drawn from the book – “if” one reads it “phenomenologically-
analytically and not as normative theory”, as Böckenförde emphasized.
Carl Schmitt’s “The Concept of the Political” certainly allows for the other, the
normative reading as well, although Böckenförde considered it a misunderstanding.
According to a normative reading, the existential fight of the community against the
enemy takes precedence over all human rights.
The turn from the normative to the “existential”, after all, does not change the fact
that Schmitt assigns the stronger force of guiding action to the existential self-
assertion, when stating, for example, that “[t]he war, the willingness to die […],
the physical killing […], all that” does have “no normative, but only an existential
meaning”; that the physical annihilation of the enemy cannot be justified by norms,
but is done “out of the existential assertion [seinsmäßige Behauptung] of one’s own
form of being”, that it is “meaningful, but only politically meaningful” (here, p. 49 f.).
It does not matter whether one characterizes one’s self-assertion against the enemy
as the highest normative command or as an existential necessity which cannot
be captured in norms: one way or the other one privileges fighting over passivity,
attributes a higher existential significance to militant action than to respect for the
enemy’s humanity.
Moreover, elsewhere Schmitt uses normative terms as well, for example, when he
speaks of a state’s "immense authority [Befugnis]” to “openly dispose of the lives
of people during the war” (p. 36), or of the “elementary rightness” of the “axiom of
protection and obedience” according to which the patron determines the enemy (p.
54).
It also fits a normative interpretation that Schmitt glorifies the state murderings
after the so-called “Roehm Putsch” as the leader’s deed, in 1934, in his “The
Fuehrer protects the law”, and says that they were “not the action of a republican
dictator” who “creates facts in a law-free zone”, but a “genuine exercise of judicial
power” (“echte Gerichtsbarkeit”) springing from “the same source of law,” from which
all rights of every nation arise: “In the highest emergency the highest law proves
itself […]. All law comes from the right of the people to live.” (here, pp. 200-201).
In the 19th century, Schmitt explaines, Dufour “defined the act of government,
eluding any judicial review”, as aiming at defending society against its enemies;
but in a “leader state” (Fuehrerstaat) that which is otherwise lawful as an ‘act of
government’ has to be so “to an incomparably greater extent” as a deed “by which
the leader has proven his supreme leadership and jurisdiction” (pp. 201-202).
3. Regardless of whether or not a normative understanding does justice to Schmitt
exegetically – it definitely helped boost Schmitt’s international reception after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
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A Schmittian doctrine that qualifies the fight of a polity against its enemies as an
existential necessity trumping any legal objections was right on cue to serve as
a justification for declaring a “war on terror”, discarding all legal constraints and
arresting and torturing terrorism suspects in Guantanamo and other prisons without
judicial review or interference.
As Quinta Jurecic pointed out, “[f]ew of the many unexpected intellectual twists and
turns of the early post-9/11 years […] were quite so unexpected – or quite so twisty
and turny – as the sudden return to prominence of […] Carl Schmitt”.
4. At Harvard Law School, Adrian Vermeule has been reviving Schmitt for quite
some time now, prominently including his teachings on the state of emergency.
In „Our Schmittian Administrative Law“ (Harv. L. Rev. 122 [2009], 1096]), Vermeule
explaines that the administrative law of the United States necessarily contains
legal “black holes” and “gray holes”, because – according to Vermeule – Schmitt’s
empirical and institutional insight is correct that, because of their unpredictable
circumstances, “[e]mergencies cannot realistically be governed by ex ante, highly
specified rules” (pp. 1099-1106, see also pp. 1136, on other countries). One
example for this is supposed to be the judicial review of detentions in Guantanamo
and other anti-terrorist prisons (pp. 1133-1134).
Like Schmitt (and unlike Böckenförde), Vermeule artfully combines neutral analysis
with ultimately normative conclusions that lead to a supremacy of national security
over individuals and their rights – acting as an explosive device for the liberal
constitutional order – which is at least carried along by ambivalent formulations.
Fundamental rights, after all, cannot create any barriers to something which is
empirically or institutionally unavoidable: impossibilium nulla est obligatio.
To wit, Vermeule has recently identified Alexander Hamilton (and James Madison)
as forerunners of such Schmittian insights (perhaps responding to advice “to toss out
Schmitt” from his theory). According to Vermeule, Hamilton and Madison have (as
Publius) identified “a dynamic or mechanism, the ‘Publius Paradox’, that warrants
great attention”: “If the bonds of constitutionalism are drawn too tightly, they will be
thrown off altogether when circumstances warrant.” (The Publius Paradox, Modern
L. Rev. 82 (2019), 1 [1]). “A polity”, Vermeule points out, “will defend itself according
to the pragmatic imperatives of natural circumstances, whatever law might say” (p.
4). Although Vermeule is consulting the Founding Fathers now, homage is paid
to Schmitt as well – by quoting Donoso Cortes instead (who was so important to
Schmitt) (p. 11 n. 34).
As in Schmitt’s case, one has to (partly) agree with Vermeule’s astute observations
– and disagree with their normative suggestions and undercurrents. It can hardly
be denied that in a state of emergency legal scruples can (and often do) disappear
all to easily. However, a democracy can fight against terrorist enemies while still
adhering to legal rules like the right to habeas corpus review or the prohibition of
torture. Neither the character of such rules as “ex ante” and “highly specified” nor
the “Publius paradox”, according to which legal shackles drawn “too tightly” will be
thrown off, rule this out.
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5. Böckenförde’s concern with Schmitt’s insights was always to salvage them for
liberal democracy, to shift them towards the rule of law and to put that in them which
is worth preserving to good use for a constitutional order of liberty and equality. He
considered it one of his main successes as a scholar “to have given Carl Schmitt’s
concepts a liberal reception” (“Carl Schmittsche Begriffe liberal rezipiert zu haben”);
see here, p. 486.
This holds true, for example, for the distribution principle of the rule of law
(rechtsstaatliches Verteilungsprinzip) according to which a citizen does not have to
justify exercising her liberty, but government has to justify restricting it. It holds true,
as well, for Schmitt’s idea that “the power to amend and supplement the Constitution
can not be limitless and has not been conferred in order to eliminate the Constitution
itself” (Verfassungslehre, 1928, p. 106). Böckenförde rightly considered this idea to
be as “in substance […] incorporated” into the German Constitution through Article
79 (3)” (see here, p. 378); an idea for which Schmitt himself referred to William
L. Marbury (The Limitations upon the Amending Power, in: Harvard L. Rev. 33
[1919/1920], pp. 223 et seq.; see p. 225: “It may be safely premised that the power
to ‘amend’ the Constitution was not intended to include the power to destroy it.”).
6. And it also holds true for Böckenfördes reception of Schmitt’s insights about the
possibility of a confrontation with an enemy and a resulting state of emergency.
To be better prepared for this possibility, Böckenförde suggested amending
the Constutition to include stronger and more effective emergency regulations.
However, according to his proposal for a general emergency power (de constitutione
ferenda), the principles of human dignity, the acknowledgement of unalienable
human rights as the basis of every polity in Article 1(2) of the Constitution as well
as other fundamental rights should “under no circumstances be derogated” (cf.
Ausnahmerecht und demokratischer Rechtsstaat, in: Vogel/Simon/Podlech [ed.], Die
Freiheit des Anderen – Festschrift für Martin Hirsch, 1981, S. 259 [268-270], Art. Y
Abs. 3).
In a state of emergency, according to Böckenförde, an exception-proof minimum
of fundamental rights should still be in force, “outermost limits, comparable to
the principles of Articles 1 and 20” of the German Constitution, should remain
insurmountable (Der verdrängte Ausnahmezustand, in: NJW 1978, S. 1881 [1890];
for the doctrine of a balancing-proof “essence of dignity” [or “core of dignity”,
Menschenwürdekern] of fundamental rights, following from Article 1 of the Constition
according to the German Constitutional Court’s longstanding case law cf. Hong,
EuConst 12 [2016], p. 549 [pp. 558-560], and here).
The state of emergency, for Böckenförde, was “not a blank cheque for arbitrary
actions not bound by any legal limit”, but was supposed to be “a clear-cut and
contained legal institution” (Die Krise der Rechtsordnung: der Ausnahmezustand, in:
Michalski (ed.), Über die Krise, 1986, p. 183 [188]).
Böckenförde was accordingly convinced as well that provisions of criminal law or the
concept of a “supra-legal emergency” (übergesetzlicher Notstand) could not grant
any powers that the special provisions of public law, especially constitutional law,
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precluded (NJW 1978, p 1881 [1882-1884]) – a question, which later writings by
Gertrude Lübbe Wolff (Rechtsstaat und Ausnahmerecht – Zur Diskussion über die
Reichweite des § 34 StGB und über die Notwendigkeit einer verfassungsrechtlichen
Regelung des Ausnahmezustandes, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 11 [1980],
p. 110 [111-117]) “answered once and for all”, in Böckenförde’s opinion: “Whoever
wants to refute her will break their doctrinal teeth trying [wird sich daran die
juristisch-dogmatischen Zähne ausbeißen]” (Rechtsstaat und Ausnahmerecht – Eine
Erwiderung, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 11 [1980], p. 591 [592]).
7. Schmittians should learn from Böckenförde, therefore, that Schmitt’s writings
do not support the claim that in a state of emergency any specific legal limits will
necessarily be ineffective.
Whenever Carl Schmitt is discussed, Böckenförde’s reading of him should be
taken into account. Although Böckenförde resisted being labelled (by Mehring)
Schmitt’s “star student” (“Meisterschüler”) for good reasons (see again here, p. 391:
If this would have “the connotation that” one “has fully embraced” Schmitt, “then
I would say no, I was not a star student.”) – he was probably more intimately
acquainted with Schmitt’s views than any other German scholar of constitutional
law, due to his intensive personal exchanges with Schmitt (which makes it a quite
irritating experience to see, for example, Vermeule’s reaction to Ralf Michaels’
recommendation to take Böckenförde’s writings into account when drawing on
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism).
If Böckenförde saw no obstacles to upholding a minimum of fundamental rights in
a state of emergency in Schmitt’s analysis, this should give pause to anyone who
reads Schmitt differently.
At the memorial service for Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde on March 9, 2019,
Johannes Masing remarked that in his third semester, in 1980, attending
Böckenförde’s seminar made him feel sure for the first time that his choice to
study law had been the right one. Bernhard Schlink said that as a listless student
he was captivated by Böckenförde’s teaching in a course in 1966/1967, and that
Böckenförde went on to become a “teacher of the Federal Republic” of Germany.
Schlink pointed out that he did not know anybody as successful, who had stayed
that modest. He recounted that when Böckenförde was awarded the Sigmund Freud
Prize for scholarly prose, he announced in his speech that, before the award, he had
not read anything by Freud.
No one who, like Böckenförde, puts the strength of the arguments front and center,
should ignore his contributions to constitutional doctrine. Fortunately, a first volume
of his writings has been published in English at Oxford University Press (a second
one is announced, see also the Special Issue of the German Law Journal of 2018
here), which has been rightly praised by Bruce Ackerman, Kim Lane Scheppele
and J.H.H. Weiler (here, under “Reviews”): “It is past time for the English-speaking
world to fully confront his remarkable contributions to modern constitutionalism.”
His writings “should be read by everyone with interests at the intersection of
constitutional and political theory”, because: “Böckenförde falls into the rare category
of indispensable scholarship.”
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